. the domain of actual →生み出された出来事(経験されようがされまいが関係ない)
. the domain of empirical → 出来事のうち、経験されたもの
The basic one is the so-called domain of real. Here we find the mechanisms. They exist irrespectively of whether they produce an event or not. When the mechanisms produce a factual event, it comes under the domain of actual, whether we observe it or not. When such an event is experienced, it becomes an empirical fact and comes under the domain of empirical. That means the critical realist perspective of the world is that the reality scientists study is larger than the domain of empirical. (p.199)
科学は、実践・実社会とどう連関していくか。 解放:"we would like to argue that the social sciences are of great relevance to social life, and that the knowledge they provide can be emancipatory." (p.177; emphasis added)
A precondition: the distinction of agency and structure
This is obviously the most important difference between social structures and agents: social structures cannot set up goals and they cannot act; only humans can ? agents are the only effective causes of society. (p.179)
While social structures cannot be reduced to individuals, the former are a prerequisite for any human action ? social structures enable actions but they also set limits to what actions are possible. (p.179)
創発性 (emergence) の重要性:構造もエージェンシーも、異なる powers and properties を持つ
the social structures are always the context in which action and social interaction take place, at the same time as social interaction constitutes the environment in which the structures are reproduced or transformed. Structure and agency are separate strata, that is, they possess completely different properties and powers, but the one is essential for how the other will be moulded. (p.181)
‘Dualism’ refers to the fact that social structures and human agency are different strata, ‘analytical’ to the fact that these strata and the interaction between them cannot be detected in the flow of social action and human experiences, but only by means of social scientific analysis. (p.181)
説明の有無に限らず「予測あり」は閉鎖システムを前提とした話で、開放システムにおいては非現実的。(なお、社会における様々な人工的組織・制度は、人間の制御可能性をあげるために作り出された疑似閉鎖システム pseudo-closed systems と考えることができる)
社会(社会構造)と人間(エージェンシー)、相対的自律のなかでの相互依存関係
Societies exist and are what they are ? among other things open, changeable systems ? because we are humans and are what we are. And we as humans are what we are because societies exist and are what they are. But a society and a human being are not two sides of the same coin. On the contrary, they are two entirely different phenomena, each with its own relative autonomy. (p.187; emphasis added)
社会科学者が実務家に提供すべきなのは、処方箋ではなく理論である。”What social scientists should provide practitioners with is not prescriptions but social scientific theories.” (p.189)
社会科学ベースの「処方箋」は特定のコンテクストを前提にした知識であり、閉鎖システムならともかく、開放システムでは役に立たない。実務家にとって真に役に立つのは、事象を生み出すメカニズムについての知識であり、それはつまり理論に関する知識である。
An example: elderly people and relocation
高齢者の転居政策に関する意思決定を事例に。
「転居は死亡率に影響を与える vs. 与えない」
But we [=social scientists] cannot say ‘Relocate!’ Nor can we say ‘Avoid relocation!’ Only someone who has insight into the real circumstances and the daily life of the people concerned may estimate how these mechanisms may manifest themselves in specific cases. And to be able to do this, practitioners must make use of social scientific theories which specify the structures and mechanisms that are relevant to the field. (p.192)
Unlike human beings, social structures are not intentional. However, they cannot be regarded as belonging to the natural sphere, since they are social products and dependent upon human action for their existence. And it is social structures that lay down the conditions for what we can do and not do by placing us in various social situations. That is why a socially emancipatory objective should be directed against structures. Emancipation here involves replacing undesired social structures with desired ones. And even in this context there are false beliefs to be considered. (p.193)
We would like to designate this attitude critical methodological pluralism, in which the foundation for what is suitable or not is to be found in the relationship between metatheory and method.
Howe holds that epistemology must not be placed above practical issues, nor the conceptual over the empirical. This is also a fundamental starting point in the pragmatic perspective. The practical and the empirical take precedence over the ontological and the epistemological, a view that the pragmatists themselves call ‘the dictatorship of the research question’ (Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998).
Although we sympathize with this pragmatic attitude to the issue, we would like to emphasize the importance of paying attention to the ontological-methodological link. We too want to see more methods in use --- when necessary. However, there is a great risk that some conclusions will be drawn that cannot be drawn from the application of a particular method unless you have made the ontological base clear. (p.152)
In one sense phenomenology is positivistic and in another sense anti-positivistic. Among the positivistic features is the belief in an objective method (free from all prejudice) and the belief that sense experiences are the source of knowledge (proximity to empiricism). A pure science based on ‘pure’ facts and not on idle speculations is desired. What primarily distinguishes the phenomenologists from the positivists is their different perspectives: phenomenologists are seeking the whole and not, like many positivists, the parts. Another difference is the view held by the former that even though sense-data are the primary source of knowledge, it is by reasoning that we attain a deeper insight into reality ? through introspection. In this process consciousness must be cleansed from the researcher's subjective thoughts. One can achieve this by letting doubt occupy the seat of honour. Phenomenology can therefore be characterized as close to empiricism and rationalistic; it takes its starting point in ‘simple sense-data’ and by means of pure reasoning it reaches true knowledge. (pp.160-161; emphasis added)
Intensive and extensive research design
量的 vs. 質的という伝統的区別に代えて、インテンシブなデザイン vs. エクステンシブなデザインという区別を提案。
First, probably nobody would deny the fact that social reality is so complex that some form of simplification is necessary to enable scientific studies. It is therefore misleading to criticize simplification as such, arguing that social reality cannot be simplified but that the complexity must be maintained if one is to understand the phenomenon. People inspired by postmodernism often take such a view. They are extremely sceptical about such theories of which we gave examples above, i.e. rational choice theory. In particular they are critical of the grand philosophies like Marxism. However, we argued in Chapters 2 and 3 that simplifications are both necessary and fruitful, and in Chapter 4 we discussed in great detail modes of procedure for this, by means of abstraction. (p.172)
In spite of the criticism we relate here, we maintain that quantitative analytical models can be fruitful and are undoubtedly valuable ? provided that their field of application is confined to what is suitable. It is of great value, for instance, to be able to measure and register changes in welfare development, so-called social statistics ? measurements often calling for sophisticated mathematical methods. We have emphasized before that quantitative descriptions are often indispensable in the research process. The limitations are revealed mainly when it comes to explanatory ambitions. It is vital to be very observant of what kind of data one uses in the analysis. Since it is generally formal relations of similarities and taxonomic groups that are involved in the extensive approach, one can hardly draw any conclusions of a causal nature from such analyses. One must be careful not to overrate the method, and be aware of its limitations. (pp.174-175; emphasis added)
Several times already we have commented on the different types of result which are the outcome of the two approaches, and it should have become clear that the crucial difference is that it is via the intensive approach that one is able to expose generative mechanisms. In an intensive design one can (at best) explain a particular occurrence or a particular object, as well as a larger social phenomenon. The extensive approach alone cannot answer questions of causation; on the other hand it can point out important empirical manifestations of mechanisms. Thus it can provide vital descriptive information, which may be useful as support in a discussion about causal powers, and it can contribute to generating questions of causality. In the fundamental issue of the relationship between the specific and the general, both intensive and extensive designs are indispensable features of the research process. (p.175)